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Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis on capital accumulation and social welfare in fiscal federalism and the unitary system 
by using an overlapping generations model. We introduce three possible cases pertaining to how government tax policy 
towards individuals could be formulated: the government imposes tax on young and old generations under fiscal 
federalism (case A); the government imposes tax only on young generation under fiscal federalism (case B) as well as 
under the unitary system (case C). We show that, the level of steady-state capital accumulation as well as social 
welfare in case A is greater than those in cases B and C if certain conditions are satisfied. Our results suggest that, 
fiscal federalism is more preferable than the unitary system.
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper presents an analysis on capital accumulation and social welfare under fiscal federalism 
and the unitary system by using an overlapping generations model. Specifically, we demonstrate a 
simple model to clarify the levels of steady-state capital accumulation and social welfare under the 
two systems by introducing three possible cases pertaining to how government’s tax policy towards 
individuals could be formulated:
1)  
a.  Case A: the government imposes a head tax on both young and old generations under fiscal 
federalism; 
b.  Case B: the government imposes a head tax only on young generation under fiscal federalism; 
c.  Case C: the government imposes a head tax only on young generation under the unitary system. 
The  basic  theoretical  principle  of  fiscal  federalism  is  perhaps  due  to  Tiebout  (1956)  who 
hypothesized that competition among communities might result in an efficiency level of the public 
good provision at the local level, if fully mobile households could choose a jurisdiction or a locality 
that provides the best fiscal packages, which met their preferences. This conjecture is further being 
elaborated  by  Oates  (1972,  1993,  1999),  and  being  supported  by,  among  others,  Bird  (1993), 
Gramlich (1993), Brueckner (1999, 2006) and Saputra (2010). However, in the opposing view, 
some  researchers  argued  that,  for  instance,  due  to  the  existence  of  market  failures  and  the 
redistribution  income  problems  (Bewley,  1981)  and  potential  distortion  of  the  local  taxation, 
(Gordon, 1983), the Tiebout and Oates conjecture in favor of fiscal federalism might no longer hold.   
Despite  few  attempts  at  theoretical  analyses,  there  has  been  substantial  research  in  the 
empirical arena with similarly divergent views. Akai and Sakata (2002), Thiesen (2003), Stansel 
(2005), Iimi (2005), Weingast (1995), Lin and Liu (2000), and Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2005) 
basically found the positive relationship between decentralization and economic growth  and further 
argued that fiscal federalism strengthen the economic growth and local fiscal incentives do matters 
in supporting local market development. On the other hand, Zhang and Zou (1998), Davoodi and 
Zou  (1998),  Xie,  Zou  and  Davoodi  (1999)  argued  that  fiscal  decentralization  of  government 
spending is associated with the lower economic growth or even harmful for growth. Woller and 
Phillips  (1998)  reported  there  is  no  significant  relationship  between  the  ratios  of  sub-national 
revenue and expenditure to total revenue and expenditure while Thornton (2007) concluded that the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth is not statistically significant.  
The objective of this paper is to fill the gap in the ongoing theoretical literatures of fiscal 
federalism that focuses on the dynamic aspects of the steady-state levels of capital accumulation 
and social welfare. This analysis, to our knowledge, is not well established in academic literatures. 
Our basic model relies on the work of Brueckner (1999) and exhibits a similar pattern to that of 
Brueckner  (2006).  We  differ  from  the  former  study  in  two  respects.  First,  we  formulate  the 
behavior of the government under the two systems in maximizing social welfare by introducing 
three possible cases of the government’s taxing policy toward individuals (in order to finance the 
public goods provision), where previous models described both individuals and government in a 
simultaneous-move Nash game. In addition, in the social welfare comparisons between the two 
systems, we intend to not only establish which is superior between fiscal federalism and the unitary 
system, but we also try to investigate the most preferable system; namely, which yields the highest 
capital stock accumulation and social welfare levels. We depart from the latter study by abstracting 
our analysis from human capital and economic growth. 
We report two main findings: first, the level of steady-state capital accumulation in case A is 
greater than that under cases B and C, while the level of steady-state capital accumulation in case B 
is  equivalent  to  that  in  case  C.  Our  first  finding  provides  another  interpretation  on  the 
understanding of steady-state level of capital accumulation in both systems, as previously argued 
by Brueckner (1999). In fact, he claimed that the steady-state level of capital accumulation in fiscal 
federalism is higher (lower) than that of under the unitary system if the young generation has a 
lower  (higher)  demand  for  public  goods  (which  will  influence  the  savings  level).  In  this 
formulation, our finding suggests that, in the two cases under fiscal federalism (case A and case B),  
the steady-state level of capital accumulation is greater than, or at least equivalent to that under the 
unitary system (case C). Second, the social welfare level in case A is greater than that in case B if 
the level of interest rate in case A,  , A r  is greater than or equal to the population growth rate,  . n  In 
our formulation, this golden rule welfare condition—the condition in which the marginal product of 
capital in the steady state is defined to be equal to the population growth rate—is a sufficient 
condition which makes the level of social welfare in the case A greater than that of case B, which 
contradicts Brueckner’s (1999). In addition, the social welfare level in case A is greater than that in 
case C if the level of interest rate in case A is greater than or equal to the rate of time preference, 
, ρ  while this rate of time preference must be greater than or equal to the population growth rate.  
In the comparison between case A and C, the condition of  ρ = A r means that individuals’ rate of 
time preference just equal to the interest rate at which they choose their level of consumption 
stream,  as  in  the  spirit  of  Olson  and  Bailey  (1981).  In  this  case,  there  is  a  stable  level  of 
consumption. Although the condition of  ρ > A r  is more consistent to the common condition in the 
real world since in almost cases, capital has a positive net marginal product, the condition that 
individuals choose a level of consumption stream if the interest rate just equal to the rate of time 
preference clearly holds for multi-period as well as two-period cases (Samuelson, 1937). Finally, 
by following the condition of  , ρ = A r   n = ρ implies that  . n rA =  If this condition is satisfied, then 
we might conclude that the social welfare level under fiscal federalism is greater than that of under 
the unitary system. Please notice that the aforementioned two comparisons (between case A and B, 
and between case A and C) are the results of distinctive formulation in terms of head tax burden 
between both generations. In the comparison between case B and C in which a head tax is imposed 
on the same generation, we might interpret that the golden rule welfare condition as being derived 
from  , ρ = A r  which implies , n = ρ is a sufficient condition to have the social welfare level under 
fiscal federalism being equal to that of under the unitary system. Thus, the social welfare level in 
case B is lower than or equal to that in case C if and only if  . n ≥ ρ
1 These results suggest that, in 
terms of capital accumulation and social welfare, case A is preferable among the three cases. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, section 3 provides 
equilibrium  characteristics  and  the  solutions  of  the  model,  section  4  presents  the  comparison 




Our  basic  framework  relies  on  the  model  of  Brueckner  (1999),  modified  to  include  the  three 
possible cases on how government’s taxing policy could be formulated. In our model, each region is 
populated by two generations, the young and the old, who are assumed to live for two periods. 
When young, individual works and divides the resulting labor income between consumption, saving 
and a head tax payment. Then, during the old period, the individual consumes the savings and any 
interest she earns, pays a head tax and dies. In all three cases, we assume that the population grows 
at  a  constant  rate  , n  where  . 0 > n  In  this  case,  we  assume  that  the  population  of  the  young 
generation is as large as  ) 1 ( n + of the old  population. The consumption of both generations is 
divided into consumption of private numeraire goods,  , i x and of public goods,  . i g  Hereafter, the 
subscripts  C B A i , , =  denote cases A, B, and C, respectively. Following Brueckner (1999), public 
goods are provided by the government and could be consumed by both generations. In this case, the 
difference between fiscal federalism and the unitary system is that, under fiscal federalism, each 
generation is living in a segregated homogenous community; while in the unitary system, both 
generations are living together in the same community. In this federalist system, the public goods 
                                                 
1 We thank the referee for his/her valuable improvement suggestion to show that the condition of  B C V V >  holds when 
, n > ρ as an additional result of our analysis.  
like police protection and recreational activities for instance, could then be provided specifically 
following a specific demand from young and old generations.  
The assumption of a segregate community under the federalist system can be criticized due to 
its lack of realism, deriving from the facts that most communities are usually inhabited by both 
young and old generations. Nevertheless, we hope that, this formulation might have some practical 
relevance and might present a benchmark for any related policies on this ground (Brueckner,1999). 
For all public goods provisions, we abstract from the constraint of capacity and congestion.  
The public goods are produced by using certain units of private goods, and are financed by a 
head tax,  , i τ  imposed on both young and old generations. In addition to the subscript i mentioned 
earlier, we also use the time subscripts index t and  , 1 + t  throughout this paper, which denote the 
periods, and the superscripts  y and  , o  which denote the young and old, respectively. The per-
capita consumption of private goods are 
y
t i x , (for young individuals born at tin case ) i  and o
t i x 1 , + (for 
old individuals born at tin case ), i  while analogous definitions also apply to the head taxes,
y
t i, τ  and 
, 1 ,
o
t i + τ  for both young and old respectively:  
2.1 Individual behavior 
2.1.1. Case A 
Under  the  federalist  system,  the  local  government  can  differentiate  the  level  of  public  goods’ 
demand between the two generations. The respective budget constraints for the young and old are 
 








t A t A t A x s r + + + = − + τ                           (2) 
 
where t A s , and  t A w , are, respectively, the level of savings and wages of the young individual at t, 
while  1 , + t A r  is the level of interest rate.  
From (1) and (2), we can obtain the lifetime budget constraint for individuals as 
.



























τ                                                                                        (3) 
The formulation of lifetime utility function follows the Brueckner (2006) type. The utility 
function is separable for both generations, in which, utility of the old is discounted by a rate of time 
preference,  . ρ  For simplicity, we define:  . ; α α α α ρ ρ ρ ρ = = = = = = C B A C B A  Thus, the utility 
function of generation t individual is assumed to be a log-linear utility function and can be given as 
], log ) 1 ( log [
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α α                                      (4) 
in which . 1 0 < <α In this function, 
y
t A g ,  and  o
t A g 1 , +  denote, respectively, the consumption of public 
goods by the young and old born at  . t Under this function, individuals maximize their utility subject 
to  budget  constraint  as  described  in  equation  (3).  By  defining  λ as  a  Lagrange-multiplier  and 
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in which, by using (7) and (3), we can derive the 
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t A x , and  , 1 ,
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The equations (8) and (9) describes the individuals’ behavior, in which the level of consumption for 
young and old depends on the level of discount rate, the rate of time preference, wage rate and head 
taxes, and the interest rate. Accordingly, an individual’s saving function can be obtained by using 
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2.1.2. Case B 
In this case, the budget constraint for the young generation remains the same as that of equation (1), 
adjusted to have a ‘B’ subscript, while the budget constraint for the old can be rearranged as 
. ) 1 ( 1 , , 1 ,
o
t B t B t B x s r + + = +                                                                                                                (11) 
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2.1.3. Case C 
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2.2. Firm’s production function 
In  each  system,  firm  produces  goods,  pays  wages  for  the  labor  input,  , ,t i L  and  makes  rental 
payments  for  the  capital  input,  . ,t i K  Technology  is  represented  by  a  production  function: 
β β − =
1
, , , t i t i t i L K Y , which exhibits constant returns to scale ( 1 0 < < β ). The per-capita term of the 
production function is 
, , ,
β
t i t i k y =                                                                                                                           (18) 
where the output-labor ratio and capital-labor ratio, respectively, are:  . / ; / , , , , , , t i t i t i t i t i t i L K k L Y y ≡ ≡  








β t i t i k r                                          (19)  , ) 1 ( , ,
β
β t i t i k w − =                                          (20) 
 
where  t i r , and  t i w , both describe the factor prices of production inputs.   
2.3. Government’s behavior 
2.3.1. Case A  
In case A, regional government imposes head taxes for both generations. The regional government 
chooses the optimal values of 
y
t A g , and  o
t A g 1 , + by considering the behavior of individuals’ born at  . t  
Public goods provision are financed by head taxes imposed on both young and old generations. 









t A ag + + =τ                                                (22) 
 
where ais a linear technology parameters in the production of public goods and assumed to be 
equivalent in all three cases. 
2.3.2. Case B 
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where, in this case, the head tax is only imposed on the young, while public goods are provided for 
both generations. 
2.3.3. Case C 
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where, in this case, a head tax is only imposed on the young, while the common level of public goods, 
, g is  provided  for  both  generations.  From  this  equation,  the  value  of  ) 1 /( ) 2 ( n n + +  describes  a 
population share of the young. Since we assume that the young population is  n + 1  as large as the old 
population,  then,  holding  the  old  population  at  a  given  date  at  , N the  population  of  the  young  is 




3.1. Capital accumulation  
Capital market clearing condition is defined such that a total saving of the young generation is equal to 
a capital stock in the next period. This condition could be stated as 
. ) 1 ( 1 , , + + = t i t i k n s                                                                                                                        (25) 
3.1.1. Case A  
Substituting (10) into (25), and by using (19) and (20), we can derive the dynamic behavior of capital 
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3.1.2. Case B  
In this case, equation (25) could be rearranged by incorporating (14) to obtain 
( ). ) 1 (
) 2 )( 1 (
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, , 1 ,
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3.1.3. Case C  
By following a similar pattern of case B above and using equation (17), we can obtain 
( ). ) 1 (
) 2 )( 1 (
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To  further  analyze  the  capital  stock  accumulation  in  a  steady-state,  let 












t i i t i t i k k k τ τ τ τ τ = = = = = + + where  o
i
y
i i k τ τ , , *  represent  the  steady-state  values  of, 
respectively,  the  capital  stock  and  the  head  tax  for  the  young  and  old  in  case i .  We  can  then 
reformulate the equations (26), (27) and (28) to get the steady-state levels of capital stock under cases 
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=             (31) 
 
3.2. The levels of public goods and head taxes 
3.2.1. Case A 
Since the regional government’s decision must also be arranged in the steady-state, we first recall the 
individuals’ behavior as stated in the equations (8) and (9) and rearrange them by replacing the level of 
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A ag τ =                                                  (21)’  . o
A
o
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The regional government’s objective function is to maximize welfare of individuals by choosing the 
appropriate levels of public goods. This function could be formulated as 
( ). log ) 1 ( log
1
1
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+ − + =                                                (32) 
Inserting (8)’, (9)’, (21)’ and (22)’into (32), we obtain: 
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By performing an optimization problem in respect to 
y
A τ  and  , o
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in which, after following some algebraic processes, we obtain 
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Thus, the levels of public good for young and old, respectively, are as follows: 
 
, ) 1 (
) 2 (











=                (38)  . ) 1 (
) 2 (



















              (39) 
3.2.2. Case B 
In this case, we first reformulate equations (12) and (13) by following similar procedures to that of 
case A above. This formulation yields 
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In order to solve the regional government’s decision, we follow equation (33) by considering the 
budget constraint as stated in (23). This formulation becomes 
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Note that, in this case, we reformulate the regional government to choose the level of public goods 
and, by using these values, we can determine the level of a head tax for the young. Performing 
standard optimization procedures with respect to 
y
B g and  , o
B g we can obtain 
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and, accordingly, the level of 
y
B τ is 
. ) 1 )( 1 ( * β β α τ B
y
B k − − =                                                                                                                (43) 
3.2.3. Case C 
We follow the same pattern in case B above by replacing the related value of a head tax as stated in 
equation (24). In this case, we might only work on  C g  and  . C τ  This formulation might be stated as 
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Solving this problem, we can get the values of  C g  and  C τ as follows: 
 
, ) 1 (
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=                  (45)  . ) 1 )( 1 ( * β β α τ C C k − − =                                    (46) 
  
3.3. The Steady State of Capital Accumulation 
We can rearrange the steady-state capital accumulation stated in equation (29) by using (36) and 
(37) to get  *
A k as follows 
.
) 2 )( 1 (

















A                                                                                                        (47) 
For  the  case  B,  by  inserting  the  corresponding  head  tax  value  in  (43)  into  (30),  we  can 
obtain *
B k which is equal to 
.
) 2 )( 1 (

















B                                                                                                        (48) 
Finally, by following the similar pattern of case B, and by using equations (31) and (46), we obtain 
.
) 2 )( 1 (

















C                                                                                                       (49) 
4.The comparisons between the two systems 
 
4.1.The comparison of steady-state capital accumulation  
We make three comparisons, which are: between *
A k  and  , *
B k *
A k  and  , *
C k  and  *
B k  and  . *
C k   
4.1.1. Between  *
A k  and  *
B k  
By subtracting (47) by (48), we can get 
.
) 2 )( 1 (
) 1 (
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B A                                                             (50) 
It is easy to see that since  , 1 α >   . * *
B A k k >  This means that the level of steady-state capital stock 
accumulation in case A is greater than that of case B. 
4.1.2. Between  *
A k  and  *
C k   
Considering the result stated in (50), since the value of  , * *
C B k k = it follows that  . * *
C A k k >   
4.1.3. Between  *
B k  and  *
C k  
It is clear that the level of  . * *
C B k k =   
Thus, by summarizing all of these three results derived from comparing the steady-state levels of 
capital accumulation, our first finding could simply be stated in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that the formulations of the three cases above hold. The comparisons of the 
level of steady-state capital accumulation in these three cases yield:  . ; ; * * * * * *
C B C A B A k k k k k k = > >   
 
The intuition behind this proposition is straightforward. In case A, where the government taxes both 
young and old generations, there is an incentive to save from young generation to maintain his or her 
desirable consumption level in the old period, as a response to the head tax being imposed by the 
government at this period. However, in case B and C, it seems that this saving incentive might be 
lower than that in case A, since the government will not impose a head tax to the young generation.  
4.2. The comparison of social welfare levels 
Let  B A V V , and  C V be the social welfare levels under case A, B and C respectively. 
4.1.1. Comparison between  A V and  B V   
In order to compare the level of social welfare under case A and B, we utilize the government’s 
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Since from the proposition 1 we know that  , * *
B A k k >  then we can easily observe that the sign of the 
first and second parts in the right hand side (RHS) of (51) are positive. On the other hand, the last part 
in the RHS of (51) contains an ambiguous value, except when a certain condition is satisfied. In this 
case, by recalling (19), we might safely assume that in the steady-state,  ,
1 *
A A r k =
− β β  in which, it 
implies that the value of the last part in the RHS of (51) depends on the magnitude of  A r  and  . n  We 
can easily see that if  , n rA ≥ then  . 0 > − B A V V  On the other hand, if  , n rA < then  B A V V − will result in 
an ambiguous value since the last part in the RHS of (51) yields a negative value. Thus, we conclude 
that  0 > − B A V V if  n rA ≥ and  B A V V − will yield an ambiguous value if otherwise.   
4.1.2. Between  A V and  C V   
By subtracting (33) by (44), we can obtain: 
.
) 1 )( 2 (
) 2 )( 1 (
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                         (52)    
From (52), we can see that the value of the first and the third parts in the RHS of (52) are positive, 
while the value of the second and the last parts remain ambiguous. The value of this second part will 
be positive or zero if  n ≥ ρ and will be negative if  . n < ρ  On the other hand, by following the previous 
assumption  that  ,
1 *
A A r k =
− β β  the  value  of  the  last  part  in  the  RHS  of  (52)  will  depend  on  the 
magnitude of  ρ , A r and  . n  In this case,  n rA ≥ ≥ ρ will make this last part become positive or at least 
zero. Therefore, based on these two conditions, we can get a condition of  n rA ≥ ≥ ρ in order to ensure 
that the value of  C A V V −  to become positive. Needless to say,  C A V V − will still positive however, if 
. n rA = = ρ From this consideration,  n rA = = ρ is a sufficient condition to ensure the positive result of 
. C A V V −  Thus, we might conclude that the social welfare in case A is greater than that in case C if 
. n rA ≥ ≥ ρ    
4.1.3. Between  B V and  C V   
Since we know that  * *
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V V C B                                                (53) 
In this equation, the social welfare comparison depends on the value of n and  . ρ  Then, if and only if 
, n = ρ  then  . C B V V =  In  addition,  we  could  still  obtain  the  sign  of  C B V V − when  . n ≠ ρ
2  By 







































V V C B                                                                                     (54) 
Then, we can obtain the derivative of the expression on the left of this inequality that is given by: 
  ,
) 2 (
)] 2 log( ) 1 [log( ) 2 ( ) 1 (
) 2 ( 2














ρ ρ ρ ρ
                                                                       (55) 
in which, one can see that  0 )] 2 log( ) 1 [log( < + − + ρ ρ while the rest is positive. Consequently, the 
expression on the left of the inequality is decreasing with respect to  . ρ Since  C B V V =  if and only if 
, n = ρ then  B c V V >  if and only if  . n > ρ We summarize these results in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition  2. The results of social welfare comparisons among the three cases could be clearly 
obtained if the following conditions are satisfied:  
a.  , B A V V >  if  ; n rA ≥  
b.  , C A V V >  if  ; n rA ≥ ≥ ρ   
c.  , C B V V = if and only if  , n = ρ and  , B C V V >  if and only if  . n > ρ  
Thus, the social welfare level under case A is greater than those of case B and C. If the conditions of a, 
b and c above do not hold, the comparisons of social welfare will yield ambiguous values. 
 
The intuition behind this proposition could be stated as follows. First, recall the equation (19). In the 







β A A k r                                                                                                                                 (19)’ 
The golden rule capital stock is defined by  . n rGR = In this case, after inserting (48) into (19)’, the 
value of  A r can be either more or less than  . GR r In particular, for α sufficiently small,  , GR A r r <  which 
means that the capital stock in the steady state exceed the golden rule level. In this paper, we assume 
that the  s ' α value is such that makes  , n r r GR A = = in order to rule out the possibility of permanent 
increase in the consumption. Brueckner (1999) called this condition as golden rule welfare condition. 
In our formulation, this golden rule welfare condition is a sufficient condition which makes the level 




The analyses in this paper suggest that the greater steady-state levels of capital accumulation and 
social welfare may constitute an additional benefit of fiscal federalism, which match the expectation of 
the most recent empirical researches in this field. These results, deriving from the three possible cases 
of the government’s taxing policy toward individuals, suggest that the level of steady-state capital 
accumulation and social welfare under fiscal federalism are greater than that of under the unitary 
system as long as certain conditions are satisfied.  
                                                 
2 We follow the referee’s suggestion in deriving this result.  
 
Appendix A 
The Unitary System: taxing on both young and old generations 
The budget constraint of government is: 
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Solving (A2) to get
y τ and  o τ will result in: 
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β β τ                         (A4)  
Inserting these levels of head taxes into (A1), we then could find  g level that is equal to zero. 
 
Appendix B 
The Unitary System: taxing on both young and old generations 
The budget constraint of government is: 
    . ag = τ                                                                                                                                          (B1) 
The government objective function could be stated as: 
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Solving (B2) to getτ will result in: 



















−                                                                                     (B3)  
Inserting these levels of head taxes into (26) by replacing the related value of  y τ and  o τ as  , τ  we 
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k                                                                           (B5) 
which cause the possibility of a multiple value of  , * k  and accordingly, there is no an exact patterns 
how  * k will evolve over time given its initial value (for more details, please see for instance, Romer, 
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1) Initially, we formulated 4 (four) cases, in  which the fourth case was formulated by taxing both young and old 
generations under the unitary system. We begin the formulation of this case by introducing two possible combinations 
in which, it differs only on its government’s budget constraint. However, the result showed that the level of public 
goods are zero, deriving from the condition that head tax for the young and old generations are canceling each other 
(Appendix A). In other case, the steady-state level of capital stock accumulation might be not in clear pattern or there is 
a  possibility  of  a  multiple  . * k  (Appendix  B).  Therefore,  we  focus  our  formulation  based  on  3  (three)  cases  as 
mentioned above. 
 